This paper studies the capacity of single-source singlesink noiseless networks under adversarial or arbitrary errors on no more than z edges. Unlike prior papers, which assume equal capacities on all links, arbitrary link capacities are considered. Results include new upper bounds, network error-correction coding strategies, and examples of network families where our bounds are tight. An example is provided of a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the best rate that can be achieved with linear coding. While coding at the source and sink suffices in networks with equal link capacities, in networks with unequal link capacities, it is shown that intermediate nodes may have to do coding, nonlinear error detection, or error correction in order to achieve the network error-correction capacity.
corrupted packet, mixed with other packets in the network, can potentially corrupt all of the information reaching a particular destination. To combat this problem, network error correction was first studied by Yeung and Cai [3] , [4] who investigated correction of errors in multicast network coding [1] , [2] , [5] on networks with unit-capacity links. In that work, the authors showed that for any network of unit-capacity links, the Singleton bound is tight and linear network error-correcting codes suffice to achieve the capacity, which equals where is the min-cut of the network and is a bound on the number of corrupted links [4, Th. 4] . The problem of network coding under Byzantine attack was also investigated in [6] , which gave an approach for detecting adversarial errors under random network coding. Construction of codes that can correct errors up to the full error-correction capability specified by the Singleton bound was presented in [7] . A variety of alternative models of adversarial attack and strategies for detecting and correcting such errors appear in the literature. Examples include [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Specifically, the network error-correction problem concerns reliable information transmission in a network with an adversary who arbitrarily corrupts the packets sent on some set of links. The location of the adversarial links is fixed for all time but unknown to the network user. We define a -error-correcting code for a single-source and single-sink network to be a code that can recover the source message at the sink node if there are at most adversarial links in the network. The -error-correcting network capacity, henceforth simply called the capacity, is the supremum over all rates achievable by -error-correcting codes.
In this work, we consider network error correction when links in the network may have unequal link capacities. (A related model, where adversaries control a fixed number of nodes rather than a fixed number of edges was studied in [16] , independently and concurrently with our initial conference paper [17] .) The unequal link capacity problem is substantially different from the equal link capacity problem studied by Yeung and Cai in [3] and [4] since the rate controlled by the adversary varies with his edge choice. In the error-free case, any link in the network with capacity can be represented by edges of capacity one without loss of generality. However, in the case with errors there is a loss of generality in using a similar representation and assuming that errors have uniform rate, since this does not capture potential tradeoffs that the adversary faces in choosing whether to attack strategically positioned or larger capacity links. The 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE Fig. 1 . The traditional cut set bound for a cut S between source s and sink t in the network shown in (a) equals the maximal rate that can be transmitted from S to S when the nodes within S are allowed unlimited information exchange and the nodes within S are allowed unlimited information exchange, as indicated by the thick bidirectional lines in (b). In the cut-set bounds employed here, we create infinite capacity connections only from each node to nodes of higher topological order on the same side of the cut, as shown by the thick unidirectional lines in (c). Restricting attention to nodes with input or output edges that cross the cut, gives a "zigzag" network, as shown in (d).
error-correction capacity in the equal link capacity case has a simple cut-set characterization since the adversary always finds it optimal to attack links on a minimum cut; as a result, coding only at the source and forwarding at intermediate nodes suffices to achieve the capacity for any single-source and single-sink network. In contrast, for networks with unequal link capacities, we show that network error-correction coding operations at intermediate nodes are needed even in the single-source single-sink case.
The cut-set approach is a simple yet powerful tool for bounding the capacity of a large network. This approach partitions the nodes into two subsets, say and , and then bounds the rate that can be transmitted from nodes in to nodes in . (See, for example, [18, Sec. 15.10] .) The maximum information transmission across the "cut" occurs when the nodes within can collaborate perfectly among themselves and the nodes within can collaborate perfectly among themselves. In this case, and all act as "supernodes" in a simple point-to-point network. All that is needed for collaboration is sufficient information exchange among the nodes on each side of the cut. Thus, the "cut-set bound" equals that rate that would be achieved in transmitting information from to if we added reliable, infinite-capacity links between each pair of nodes in and reliable, infinite-capacity links between each pair of nodes in , as shown in Fig. 1 . Given a network of capacitated error-free links with a source node and a sink node , minimizing over all choices of that contain but exclude gives a tight bound on the unicast capacity from to [19] . In contrast, this traditional cut-set bounding approach is not tight in general when it comes to the error-correction capacity of networks with unequal link capacities, even in the case of unicast demands. In this case, two new issues arise. We next describe each of these issues in turn.
The first issue concerns the role of feedback across , i.e., links from to . While feedback never increases the capacity across a cut in a network of reliable links, it can increase the error-correction capacity. Intuitively, this is because feedback allows us to inform nodes in about what was received by nodes in , thereby aiding in the discovery of adversarial links. 1 Treating all nodes in as one supernode and all nodes in as another supernode, as in the traditional cut-set bounding approach, makes all feedback information available to all nodes in and all feedforward information available to all nodes in . This may give them considerably more insight into the adversary's location than is available to them in the original network.
We can obtain tighter bounds by taking into account limitations on which nodes in can influence the values on each feedback edge and which nodes in have access to the feedback information. This is important in the unequal link capacity case, because it captures tradeoffs faced by the adversary in choosing whether to attack links based on their capacity or whether they are upstream of feedback links that may give clues about the adversary's actions. Specifically, given an acyclic network , we construct an acyclic network by adding a reliable infinite capacity connection from a node to a node only if contains a directed path from node to node via nodes in , and adding a reliable infinite capacity connection from a node to a node only if contains a directed path from node to node via nodes in . Fig. 1(c) shows an example. Limiting the added connections in this way creates what we call a "zigzag" network, as shown in Fig. 1 . We draw only those nodes in and with incoming or outgoing edges that cross between and , and draw the nodes on each side of the cut in topologically increasing order. The "forward" edges across the cut point downwards in the diagram, while "feedback" edges point upwards. By studying the capacity of these zigzag networks, we develop upper bounds on error-correction capacity that apply to general acyclic networks. We also illustrate the usefulness of these bounds by giving examples where they improve upon previously known bounds and showing that they are tight for families of networks that are special cases of zigzag networks.
However, the second issue with the cut-set approach to bounding network capacities is the notion of a cut itself. Kosut et al. [20] show, for the more general case where only a subset of links are potentially adversarial, the existence of networks for which no partition yields a tight bound on the error-correction capacity. This is proven by example using a network whose minimal cut (which has no feedback links) yields a capacity bound that is proven to be unachievable. As a result, knowledge of the capacity of the network's minimal cut is insufficient to determine the capacity of all possible networks, and we cannot hope to derive cut-set bounds that are tight in general. Nonetheless, given the complexity of taking into account the full network topology, we proceed to study the cut-set approach, deriving general bounds and demonstrating that those bounds are tight in some cases.
Specifically, in Section III, we begin with the cut-set upper bound given by the capacity of the two-node network shown in Fig. 2 , which is the only cyclic network we consider in this paper. In this network, the source node can transmit packets to the sink node along the forward links and the sink node can send information back to the source node along the feedback links. As mentioned above, this cut-set bound can be quite loose since it assumes that all feedback is available to the source node and all information crossing the cut in the forward direction is available to the sink. We therefore develop a new cut-set upper bound for general acyclic networks by taking into account more details of the topological relationships among links on the cut, as in the zigzag network construction shown in Fig. 1 .
In Section IV, we consider a variety of linear and nonlinear coding strategies useful for achieving the capacity of various example networks. We prove the insufficiency of linear network codes to achieve the capacity by providing an example of a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the linear coding capacity and is achieved using a nonlinear error detection strategy. A similar example for the problem with Byzantine attack on nodes rather than edges appears in [16] . We also give examples of single-source and single-sink networks for which intermediate nodes must perform coding, nonlinear error detection, or error correction in order to achieve the network capacity. We describe a simple greedy algorithm for error correction at intermediate nodes. We then introduce a new coding strategy called "guess-and-forward." In this strategy, an intermediate node that receives some redundant information from multiple paths guesses which of its upstream links are controlled by the adversary. The intermediate node forwards unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B on one side of the cut and from node A to sink t on the other side of the cut, respectively. There are feedback links from A to B.
its guess to the sink, which tests the hypothesis of the guessing node. In Section V, we show that guess-and-forward achieves network capacity on the two-node network with feedback links of Fig. 2 , as well as the family of four-node acyclic networks in Fig. 3 when the capacity of each feedback link is not too small (i.e., above a value given by a linear optimization). 2 Finally, we apply guess-and-forward strategy to zigzag networks, deriving achievable rates and presenting conditions under which our upper bound is tight. We conclude in Section VI with a discussion of future work.
Portions of this work have appeared in our earlier work [17] , [21] , which introduced the network error-correction problem with unequal link capacities and presented a subset of the results.
II. PRELIMINARIES

Consider a directed acyclic communication network
with unequal link capacities. Let denote the capacity of edge
. A source node transmits information to a sink node over the network . Transmissions occur on the links according to their topological order, i.e., a link transmits after all its incident incoming links, and we regard a link error as being applied upon transmission. A link (or node) is said to be upstream of another link (or node) iff there is a directed path starting from the former and ending with the latter. A link (or node) is said to be downstream of another link (or node) iff there is a directed path starting from the latter and ending with the former.
In this paper, we consider the problem of correcting arbitrary adversarial errors on up to links. The location of error links is fixed for all time but unknown to the network user.
Definition 1:
A network code is -error link correcting if the source message can be recovered by the sink node provided that the adversary controls at most links. Thus, a -error link-correcting network code can correct any adversarial links for .
Let be a partition of , and define the cut for the partition by
The cut separates nodes and if and . We use to denote the set of cuts between and . Given a cut , we call any link in a forward link, and we call any link from to a feedback link. For the achievable strategies in Sections IV and V, we assume that coding occurs in the finite field for some prime power . An error on any link is specified by a vector containing symbols in . The output of link equals the sum in of the input to link and the error applied to link , i.e., . We say that an error occurs on the link if . As in [3] and [4] , we can consider a linear network code that assigns a set of vectors , called global coding vectors, to each link in the network. Let denote the error-free output of link when the network input is where denotes the inner product of row vectors and . We use to denote the vector of errors on the entire network. The output of a link is a function of both the network input and the error vector , which we denote by . For each node , we use and to denote the sets of incoming and outgoing edges, respectively, for node . With this notation, a sink node cannot distinguish between the case where is the network input and error occurs and the case where is the network input and error occurs if and only if 
III. UPPER BOUNDS
In this section, we consider upper bounds on network errorcorrection capacity. Let denote the source alphabet and the size of the (arbitrary) link alphabet. The corresponding network transmission rate is given by . We first derive the cut-set upper bound obtained from coalescing all nodes on each side of the cut into a supernode, resulting in a two-node network as shown in Fig . Suppose that and we show a contradiction. Since , there are two codewords and in that can be sent reliably. When is sent along the forward links and the leftmost links are adversarial, the adversary changes to so that the outputs of the leftmost links of are the same as that of . Similarly, when is sent along the forward links and the rightmost links are adversarial, the adversary changes to so that the outputs of the rightmost links of are the same as that of . Then, the two codewords cannot be distinguished and this contradicts . Case 2)
. When the sink knows adversarial links are the largest capacities forward links, the maximum achievable capacity is . When and all feedback links are adversarial, there are adversarial forward links whose locations are unknown. In this scenario, we show that the best achievable rate is , which is the sum of smallest forward link capacities. We assume that , and show that this leads to a contradiction. denotes the set of forward links such that the links indexed in increasing capacity order, i.e., . Since and is sum of the smallest forward link capacities, there exist two distinct codewords such that . So we can write where denotes the error-free vector of symbols on when codeword is transmitted.
We can construct -error links that change to the value as follows. We apply an error of value on links for . Since this does not change the output value of other links, we obtain . For , we can follow a similar procedure to construct error links that change the value of to . Thus, sink node cannot reliably distinguish between the source symbol and , which gives a contradiction.
Therefore, the upper bound on achievable capacity is .
In Section V, we show that this bound is the actual capacity of the two-node network. Thus, the supernode construction gives the following cut-set upper bound for general acyclic networks. However, we can show that the above upper bound is not tight using the following generalized Singleton bound, which was presented in our conference paper [17] . A similar upper bound for the problem of adversarial attack on nodes rather than edges was given in independent work [16] .
Definition 2: Any set of links on a cut
is said to satisfy the downstream condition on if none of the links in is downstream of any link in .
Lemma 4 (A Generalized Singleton Bound):
Consider any -error-correcting network code with source alphabet in an acyclic network . Consider any set consisting of links on a source-sink cut that satisfies the downstream condition on . Let be the total capacity of the links in . Then
Proof:
The proof is similar to that of the network Singleton bound for the equal link capacity case in [3] . We assume that , and show that this leads to a contradiction. Given a cut denotes the number of links in . For brevity, let where and links in are ordered topologically, i.e., is not downstream of for any . Since and is the capacity of , there exist two distinct codewords such that . So we can write where denotes the error-free vector of symbols on when codeword is transmitted. We will show that it is possible for the adversary to produce exactly the same outputs on all the channels in when errors occur on at most links in .
Assume that the true network input is . The adversary will inject errors on links in this order as follows. First, the adversary applies an error on link to change the output from to . The output of links may be affected by this change, but the outputs of links will not. Let and denote the outputs of links and , respectively, after the adversary has injected errors on link , where with . Then, the adversary injects errors on link to change its output from to . This process continues until the adversary finishes injecting errors on links and the output of this channel changes from to . Now suppose the input is . We can follow a similar procedure by injecting errors on links . Then, the adversary can produce the outputs Thus, sink node cannot reliably distinguish between the source symbol and , which gives a contradiction.
Consider the example four-node network shown in Fig. 4 . When , the two-node bound Lemma 3 gives the upper bound 22. The generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 2.
However, the generalized Singleton bound is also not tight. Building on ideas from the above bounds, we proceed to derive tighter bounds.
Let denote the set of feedback links across cut . Given a set of feedback links and a set of forward links , we use to denote the upper bound obtained from Lemma 4 (generalized Singleton bound) when evaluated for adversarial links on the cut after erasing and from the graph . Let
Then, we define as follows:
For instance, consider the two-layer zigzag network in Fig. 6 . If , and by choosing , and removing in the application of the Singleton bound after erasing and . By taking the minimum over and , we can show that .
Lemma 5 (Cut-Set Upper Bound 1):
Consider any -errorcorrecting network code with source alphabet in an acyclic network Proof: For any cut , the adversary can erase a set of feedback links and a set of forward links where and . Applying Lemma 4 on after erasing and gives the upper bound . By taking the minimum over all cuts , we obtain the above bound.
The following examples illustrate how the bound in Lemma 5 tightens the generalized Singleton bound. We first consider a four-node acyclic network as shown in Fig. 5 . In each example, unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source to its neighbor on one side of the cut and from node to sink on the other side of the cut. There are feedback links with arbitrary capacities from to .
When we compute the generalized Singleton bound, for any cut , we choose and erase links in the cut such that none of the remaining links in the cut is downstream of the chosen links. Then, we sum the remaining link capacities and take the minimum over all cuts. Because of the downstream condition, when the link capacities between and are much larger than the link capacities between and , the Singleton bound may not be tight. For example, in the network in Fig. 5(a) , if , then the generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 20. However, when the adversary declares that he will use two forward links between and , we obtain the erasure bound 4.
As another example, consider the network in Fig. 5 (b) when . Applying the generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 16. If the adversary erases one of the forward links between and and we apply the generalized Singleton bound on the remaining network, then our upper bound is improved to 15. The intuition behind this example is that when the adversary erases large capacities links, which do not satisfy the downstream condition, applying the generalized Singleton bound on remaining network with adversarial links can give a tighter bound.
For the two-layer zigzag network in Fig. 6 , when , the min-cut is 37 and the generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 27. Suppose that the adversary declares that he will use the feedback link between and and the forward link with capacity between and . By applying the generalized Singleton bound on the remaining network with two adversarial links, we obtain . The intuition behind this example is that the links between and and the links between and have the same topological order once the single feedback link between and is erased. Since the generalized Singleton bound is obtained by erasing links on the cut such that none of the remaining links on the cut is downstream of any erased links, erasing the single feedback link between and yields a tighter Singleton bound even with fewer adversarial links. Moreover, before applying the Singleton bound, we first erase the link with capacity , which is the largest link between and as we did in example in Fig. 5 (b). Next, we introduce another upper bounding approach, which considers confusion between two possible sets of adversarial links, each containing some forward links as well as the corresponding downstream feedback links required to prevent error propagation. Consider any cut and sets . We say that a feedback link is directly downstream of a forward link (and that is directly upstream of ) if there is a directed path starting from and ending with that does not include other links in or . Let be the set of links in , which are directly downstream of a link in and upstream of a link in . Let be the set of links in , which are directly downstream of a link in and upstream of a link in .
Lemma 6 (Cut-Set Upper Bound 2): Let denote the total capacity of the remaining links on . If for , then
Proof: We assume that , and show that this leads to a contradiction. Let denote the number of links on the cut . Since , from the definition of , there exist two distinct codewords such that error-free outputs on the links in are the same. Let and . Then, we can write where denotes the error-free outputs on the links in for and and denote the error-free outputs on the links in for and , respectively; and and denote the error-free outputs on the links in for and , respectively. We will show that it is possible for the adversary to produce exactly the same outputs on all the channels in under and when errors occur on at most links. When codeword is sent, we use to denote the error-free symbols on feedback link .
Assume the input of network is . The adversary chooses feedback links set and forward links set as its adversarial links. First, the adversary applies errors on to change the output from to for and to cause each feedback link to transmit . Since all feedback links that are directly downstream of a link in and upstream of a link in transmit the error-free symbols, the outputs on links in are not affected. The outputs on links in may be affected, and we denote their new values by . Thus, the sink observes . When codeword is transmitted, the adversary chooses feedback links set and forward links set as its adversarial links. The adversary applies errors on them to change to and to cause each feedback link to transmit . Since all feedback links that are directly downstream of a link in and upstream of a link in transmit the error-free symbols, the outputs on any other links are not affected. Therefore, the output is changed from to . Thus, the sink node cannot reliably distinguish between the codewords and , which gives a contradiction.
Given a cut , we consider all possible sets on satisfying the condition of Lemma 6. We choose sets among them that have the maximum total link capacities and define to be the sum of the capacities of the links in . This gives the upper bound
The following example shows that we can obtain a tighter upper bound using Lemma 6. For the example network in Fig. 7 , when , Lemma 5 gives upper bound 9. However, Lemma 6 gives a tighter upper bound 8 when , and . Now we derive a generalized cut-set upper bound that unifies Lemmas 5 and 6. Given a cut , consider a set of forward links and a set of feedback links such that . Let denote the upper bound obtained from Lemma 6 when evaluated for adversarial links on the cut after erasing and from the original graph . Then is an upper bound on the error-correction capacity of . This includes the bound of Lemma 5 as a special case, since the generalized Singleton bound is a special case of the upper bound in Lemma 6 corresponding to the case where is a set of links satisfying the downstream condition. It is also clear that is the same as the bound in Lemma 6 when . Note, however, that any bound obtainable with a nonempty set of erased feedback links is also obtainable by including those links in the sets and of Lemma 6 instead of erasing them. Thus, we define and state our upper bound as follows. 3 
Theorem 1 (A Generalized Cut-Set Upper Bound):
Consider any -error-correcting network code with source alphabet in an acyclic network. Then
IV. CODING STRATEGIES
We consider a variety of linear and nonlinear coding strategies useful for achieving the capacity of various example networks. We show the insufficiency of linear network codes for achieving the capacity in general. We also demonstrate examples of networks with a single source and a single sink where, unlike the equal link capacity case, it is necessary for intermediate nodes to do coding, nonlinear error detection, or error correction in order to achieve the capacity. We then introduce a new coding strategy, guess-and-forward.
A. Error Detection at Intermediate Nodes and Insufficiency of Linear Codes
Here we show that there exists a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the best rate that can be achieved with linear coding. We consider the single-source and single-sink network in Fig. 8 , where source aims to transmit the information to a sink node . We index the links and assume the capacities of links as shown in Fig. 8 . For a single adversarial link, our upper bound from Theorem 1 is 2.
Lemma 7: Given a network in Fig. 8 , for a single adversarial link, rate is asymptotically achievable with a nonlinear error detection strategy, whereas scalar linear network coding achieves at most . Proof: We first illustrate the nonlinear error detection strategy as follows. Source wants to transmit two packets . We send them in channel uses, but each packet has only bits. We use one bit as a signaling bit. We send down all links in the top layer. In the middle layer, we do the following operations. (2) where is the source alphabet. We will show that there exists satisfying the above equation when errors occur on the links and in error vector .
Let denote the transfer matrix between and in the rounds. Its rows are the global coding vectors assigned on , and in the rounds. Note that to transmit symbols reliably, should have rank . Let and denote the transfer matrices between and , and between and during rounds, respectively. To transmit symbols reliably, both and should have rank at least , i.e., and . Otherwise, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, the maximum achievable rate is at most from the data processing inequality, which gives a contradiction.
Let and denote the errors occurring on links and , respectively. Error propagates to and , and error propagates to and . From (2), we have the following set of equations: The following corollary shows that vector linear codes 4 (see e.g., [22] ) also achieve at most rate .
Corollary 1: For the network in Fig. 8 with a single adversarial link, a vector linear network code can achieve at most rate . Proof: For a vector linear code, the outgoing edges of each node carry vectors of alphabet symbols, which are a function of the vectors carried on the incoming edges to the node. We consider a vector linear code that groups symbols into a vector. As in Lemma 7, we define the transfer matrix between and . Transfer matrices and are also defined in the same way, and and . As in the proof of Lemma 7, when , we can show that there exists vectors satisfying
B. Error Correction at Intermediate Nodes
We next give an example in which error correction at intermediate nodes is used for achieving the capacity. The intuition behind our approach is that error correction at intermediate nodes can reduce the error propagation to the links in the bottom layer and MDS code assigned on the bottom layer gives the correct output. We consider a single-source destination network in Fig. 9 . For a single adversarial link, upper bound from Theorem 1 is 8. From Section IV-A, the upper bound on the linear coding capacity is . Fig. 9 . A single-source and single-sink network : The link capacity in this network is as follows: r(l ) = r(l ) = r(l ) = r(l ) = 4; r(l ) = 1 1 1 = r(l ) = 2. All the links in the middle layer have capacity 1. Error correction at Y and Y is necessary for achieving the capacity.
Lemma 8: Given the network in Fig. 9 , for a single adversarial link, rate is achievable using error correction at intermediate nodes.
Proof: Without loss of generality, all nodes except and forward their received information. We first assign a MDS code on the bottom layer links and apply a MDS code at each decision node, e.g., we assign and on incoming links to and , respectively. Then, we can assign codewords on all links in the network since all nodes except and are forwarding nodes. If the adversarial link is on the middle or bottom layer, at most two errors are propagated to the sink node and the MDS code assigned on the bottom layer gives the correct output. If the adversarial link is on the top layer, at most two errors are propagated to the sink node through forwarding nodes , and . Since at most one error is incoming to and , respectively, the MDS code applied at each decision node gives error-free output and . Therefore, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, at most two errors are propagated to the sink and the MDS code returns the correct output.
One possible generalization of the above intermediate node error correction is as follows. Given an acyclic network , we use and to denote the min-cut between the source and , and the min-cut between and the sink in , respectively. We assume that there is a fixed set of nodes such that for and error correction can be applied only at nodes in . For instance, in Fig. 9 , . Let denote the difference between the max-flow from to and the max-flow from to .
The selection function chooses a node on , which maximizes . Precisely
Here is the outline of our greedy algorithm with error correction at intermediate nodes. Given an acyclic network and the set of error-correction nodes , we choose a node that maximizes on . Since is the max-flow from to , we can find paths so that each path carries one symbol from to . Likewise, we also find paths from to . Let denote the subgraph composed of above paths. We assign a MDS code on . We remove from and add it to , which denotes the union of subgraphs for which codewords are already assigned. We also remove from . We repeat the above procedure until or there is no node such that . A precise description of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Error Correction at Intermediate Nodes
While and s.t.
endwhile return
Since max-flow can be computed in polynomial-time, this algorithm is a polynomial-time greedy algorithm.
C. Coding at Intermediate Nodes
Here we consider an example of a single-source and singlesink network, shown in Fig. 10 , whose capacity is achieved using linear coding at intermediate nodes rather than nonlinear error correction or detection. For a single adversarial link, the upper bound obtained from Theorem 1 is 4.
Lemma 9: Given the network in Fig. 10 , for a single adversarial link, coding at intermediate nodes achieves the rate .
Proof: To achieve rate , any four links on the top layer should carry four independent packets. Otherwise, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, source cannot transmit four packets reliably. Then, the data processing inequality gives a contradiction. Similarly, any two links on the bottom layer should carry four independent packets. Since is connected to at most four different nodes among for and all links in the middle layer have capacity , each of , and receives all independent information. Thus, we cannot apply simple error detection or correction at
, and . Suppose that only forwarding strategy is used on this network. Then, we show that rate is not achievable. There are six symbols on the top layer. Since we use only forwarding, these are forwarded to the bottom layer. Since bottom layer links have total capacity , there are at least two same symbols on the bottom layer links. This contradicts that any two links on the bottom layer should carry four independent information to achieve rate . Therefore, forwarding is insufficient for achieving rate in this network. Now we show that a generic linear network code, where intermediate nodes do coding, achieves rate . From [22, Ch. 19 ], a generic network code can be constructed with high probability by randomly choosing the global encoding kernels provided that the base field is sufficiently large. So a random linear network code is generic with high probability when is very large. If the adversarial link is on the top or middle layer, then each capacity on the bottom layer is equivalent to two unit capacity links. Then, all links in the network have capacity and this problem is reduced to the equal link capacities problem. From [4] , rate is achievable. From [22, Th. 19 .32], since the min-cut between and is at least for , in a generic network code, the global encoding kernels on any two links on the bottom layer are linearly independent and they satisfy the MDS property. Thus, an error on the last layer can be corrected.
D. Guess-and-Forward
Here we introduce a new achievable coding strategy, guessand-forward. In this strategy, a node receives some redundant information from multiple paths. If this information is inconsistent, the node guesses which of its upstream links are controlled by the adversary and forwards its guess to the sink. The sink receives additional information allowing it to test the hypothesis of the guessing node and correctly identify one or more adversarial links. Altogether a finite number of guesses are forwarded, so the average overhead of forwarding guesses goes to zero asymptotically with the total amount of information communicated.
To provide intuition, we first describe a simple version of the guess-and-forward scheme on a particular four-node network example shown in Fig. 11 . From Theorem 1, when , the capacity is upper bounded by 7. We will show that rate is achievable in this network using the guess-and-forward scheme. Fig. 11 . Four-node acyclic networks: this network consists of three links of capacity 2 from s to A, five links of capacity 1 from B to t, one link of capacity 6 from A to B. Given the cut (fs; Bg; fA; tg), unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B on one side of the cut and from node A to sink t on the other side of the cut, respectively.
In this scheme, node forwards its received information to node and on multiple links to the sink node . This information is received reliably by the sink, but not necessarily by since the single feedback link from to may be adversarial. Node also receives reliably from the source node the information that was sent from to , and compares this with the information forwarded by . A mismatch indicates that either the feedback link is adversarial or that one or more links from to are adversarial. sends this guess to the sink along with the information received on link , which allows the sink to distinguish between the two possibilities. Note that decoding at the sink relies on knowledge of the network and code, while the guessing node simply has to compare the feedback with the corresponding information forwarded from the source node.
To be precise, let and denote the symbols sent by and received by , respectively, on the links from to . is sent reliably from to , and is sent reliably from to . In each round, and together send a MDS code to and across the cut . Since the feedback link has capacity , sends its codeword symbols to along feedback link . For feedback link , let denote the information received by on . compares with , which is received from . If , then obtains a guess identifying the locations of adversarial links between and assuming is reliable. sends the claim to along each link between and using repetition code. If does not send any claim. sends claims only when it guesses at least one adversarial forward link, which is different from those guessed in previous rounds. Thus, sends claims in three rounds, which is equal to the number of links between and . Note that as a result the number of channel uses is not constant in each round. Since the total number of channel uses required to send claims is finite, the overhead amortized over a large number of rounds goes to zero asymptotically with the number of rounds.
Lemma 10: Given the network in Fig. 11 , rate is achievable.
Proof: Since there are links from to , any claim can be sent reliably from to using a repetition code.
Case 1) The sink receives some claim . The sink compares with , which is received from reliably. If , then the feedback link transmitting is adversarial and the sink ignores it. Otherwise, is reliable. Since the claim is sent, the sink knows that and that guess is correct. Thus, the sink identifies the forward links in as adversarial, which are subsequently ignored. Case 2) No claims are sent. In this case, we show that the correct output is achieved. No claims are sent only if either • receives on the feedback link, or • the guessed set only contains forward links that have been guessed by in previous rounds. From these previous rounds, by case 1), the sink has already identified as adversarial either or the guessed forward links, and is concerned only with the remaining network. Either way, there are the following two possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that transmits to ). I) All links between and and the feedback link are uncorrupted. II) Some links between and are corrupted and feedback link is corrupted such that feedback link transmits errorfree output. In possibility I), the feedback link transmits to . In II), sends but the feedback link changes it to so that does not send any claims. We first consider all sets of seven forward links on the cut. There are such sets of links. Each set has total capacity at least . For each such set , the sink checks the consistency of the output of rate obtained from . We also consider all sets of six links such that each set includes all three links between and and any three links between and . There are such sets. The sink also checks the consistency of the output of rate for each set.
Case 2a) There is no set of seven links giving consistent output.
In this case, there are more than one forward adversarial link on the cut. Since , all two adversarial links are forward links and thus possibility II) cannot hold. Then, possibility I) is true and there are at most two forward adversarial links with capacity on the cut. We obtain the correct answer from our MDS code. Case 2b) There is no set of six links that includes all three links from to and gives consistent output.
In this case, possibility II) is true. Then, there is at most one forward adversarial link on the cut. We obtain the correct answer from our MDS code. Case 2c) There exist both a seven-link set giving consistent output and a six-link set that includes all three links between and and give consistent output.
It is clear that for any and . Thus, and
give the same consistent output. Since at least one of I) and II) is true, this output is correct.
From cases 1) and 2), since needs to send claims at most two times to obtain the correct output. 
V. GUESS-AND-FORWARD ON SOME FAMILIES OF NETWORKS
In this section, we employ the guess-and-forward strategy on a sequence of increasingly complex network families. The first is a two-node network with multiple feedback links. The second is a four-node acyclic network. The third is a family of "zigzag" networks. In the first two cases, the guess-and-forward strategy achieves the capacity. For zigzag networks, we derive the achievable rate of guess-and-forward strategy and present conditions under which this bound is tight.
A. Two-Node Network
We achieve the error-correction capacity of the two-node network with multiple feedback links by using guess-and-forward strategy. A two-node network shown in Fig. 12 is composed of forward links with arbitrary capacity and feedback links with arbitrary capacity. In Lemma 11, we first characterize the capacity of this network when each forward link has capacity . We extend this result to Theorem 2 when each forward link has arbitrary capacity.
Lemma 11: Consider the two-node network shown in Fig. 12 such that each forward link has capacity . Let denote the error-correction capacity with adversarial links. If . Otherwise, . Proof: From Lemma 2 in Section III, upper bound of the capacity is when , and otherwise. So it is sufficient to prove the achievability of this upper bound by applying our guess-and-forward strategy when .
Case 1)
.
Step 1) In each round, the source sends an MDS code on the forward links. Since . Thus, for any received signals, there exist uncorrupted signals. If all subsets of received symbols decode to the same message, this message is correct. Otherwise, the sink sends the received signals to the source on each feedback link using a repetition code.
Step 2) Based on the received information on each feedback link, the source tries to identify the bad forward links. Thus, for each feedback link, the source obtains a claim regarding the location of forward adversarial links, which is correct if that feedback link is not adversarial.
Step 3) This step consists of phases, each composed of a finite number of rounds. In the th phase, the source sends the claim obtained from the th feedback link together with what it received on that feedback link to the sink. This information can be sent reliably to the sink using a repetition code because . If what the source received matches what the sink sent, the th feedback link was not corrupted and the associated claim is correct. Using this claim, the sink can decode the message as well as identify at least one of the forward adversarial links. If all feedback links were corrupted, the sink knows that there are only forward adversarial links and since we are using an MDS code the message is correctly decodable at the sink.
Note that we only need to use the above scheme during the first times the sink sees inconsistency at Step 1). The reason is that from Steps 1)-3), the sink either figures out that all feedback links are adversarial or identifies at least one forward adversarial link. If all feedback links are bad, they are ignored and the MDS code gives us the correct output. If there are forward adversarial links, after the first times the sink sees inconsistency at Step 1), all forward adversarial links are identified subsequently and no further inconsistency is seen among the remaining forward links. Otherwise, when there are more than adversarial links, the sink finds forward adversarial links and ignores them. Then, from [4] , the rate can be achieved using the remaining forward links only.
Case 2) . In each round, the source sends an MDS code on the forward links. For any received signals, there exist uncorrupted signals. If all subsets of received symbols decode to the same message, this message is correct. As in Case 2a), from Steps 2) and 3), the sink either concludes that all feedback links are adversarial or identifies at least one forward adversarial link. If all feedback links were corrupted, there are only bad forward links and subsequently only the forward links are used to achieve the rate . Otherwise, the above scheme is used at most times and inconsistency is seen at step 1), after which the sink has identified all bad forward links and the remaining forward links suffice to achieve rate . Now we generalize above result to the general case when each forward link has also arbitrary capacity. 
B. Four-Node Acyclic Network
In this section, we use the guess-and-forward strategy on a four-node acyclic network, the simplest case of a zigzag network. In this acyclic network, source node and its neighbor node lie on one side of a cut that separates them from sink node an its neighbor . As in the cut-set model, we allow unbounded reliable communication from source to its neighbor on one side of the cut and from node to the sink on the other side of the cut; this allows node to compare information from feedback links with uncorrupted information from the source to obtain the guess. Similarly, by comparing claims with information reliably transmitted from node , the sink can identify the corrupted link.
This network is composed of a set of forward links with arbitrary capacities from to , a set of forward links with arbitrary capacities from to sink , and a set of feedback links from to . Each feedback link has capacity whose value will be derived in following Section V-B1. and denotes the sum of forward link capacities from to , and from to , respectively. Let . is the upper bound on this network obtained from Theorem 1.
In [21] , we have shown that rate is asymptotically achievable on this four-node acyclic network when each feedback link has capacity at least . Here we show that rate is achievable even when each feedback link has smaller capacity than . In Section V-B1, we first consider a coding strategy at node and formulate a linear optimization problem which gives the minimum capacity of each feedback link that guarantees the success of our strategy. Then, in Section V-B2, we show that rate is asymptotically achievable this smaller feedback link capacity using our guess-and-forward strategy.
1) Coding Strategy at Node : Suppose that sends MDS code across the cut to . We consider the encoding strategy at node and derive the minimum capacity of each feedback link. Suppose that node receives the vector of symbols from where denotes the codewords on link . We first assume that node transmits, on each feedback link to , the same set of codewords each of which is a linear combination of codewords received on a single link from to . Precisely, for any forward link , node transmits on each feedback link where is a single linear combination of . Thus, the same value is transmitted on each feedback link. For instance, given a network in Fig. 14(a) , transmits where , and . Here, we define the degree of freedom of forward link between and as follows. . Then, the degree of freedom of link , is defined as the capacity of link minus the rank of the matrix , i.e., . For any forward link between and , we simply define the degree of freedom as the link capacity, i.e., .
For example, in Fig. 14(a) , since feedback link transmits for all forward links from to . In Fig. 14(b) , since feedback link transmits , and . From the definition of degree of freedom, node sends (3) codewords to along each feedback link. Now we introduce our coding strategy at node as follows. Node can choose any , which satisfies the following two conditions on the degree of freedom of links.
Condition 1: Given any set
composed of forward links, .
Condition 2:
Given any set composed of forward links and composed of forward links such that .
Condition 1 means that the sum of the degree of freedom of any forward links are less than or equal to . Condition 2 means that the sum of the degree of freedom of any links plus the sum of any link capacities is less than or equal to . In the proof of Lemmas 13 and 14, we show that these two conditions are necessary to prove the tightness of our upper bound in Theorem 1. For example, network in Fig. 14(a) and the upper bound . Three codewords sent by satisfy the above two conditions, and feedback capacity is sufficient. Likewise, when and the upper bound in the network Fig. 14(b) , five codewords sent by also satisfy the above two conditions. In [21] , the minimum required capacity for each feedback link to achieve rate is the sum of all forward link capacities between and , which is and for the networks in Fig. 14(a) and (b) , respectively.
Finally, we formulate a linear optimization problem, which gives the minimum capacity of each feedback link, based on Conditions 1 and 2 (4) Fig. 13 . Four-node acyclic networks: unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B and from node A to sink t, respectively. This network consists of a links of arbitrary capacity from s to A; b links of arbitrary capacity from B to t. From A to B, there are m feedback links and each feedback link has the minimum capacity.
Objective function is defined in (3). The first inequality constraint is the link capacity constraint. The second and third constraints come from Condition 1 and 2, respectively. We can check that solving the above optimization problem for the networks in Fig. 14(a) and (b) gives the feedback link capacities and , respectively.
2) Guess-and-Forward Strategy: In this section, we show the tightness of the upper bound using our guess-and-forward strategy. Our proof of decoding success requires each feedback link's capacity to satisfy the lower bound obtained in (4), so that node receives sufficient feedback information to guess the corrupted links by comparing with information reliably received from the source. This feedback link capacity can in general be smaller than that in the simple example of Section V-B1, so the details and proof of correctness of the scheme are slightly more involved.
The guess-and-forward strategy achieving the rate for the four-node acyclic network shown in Fig. 13 is as follows. In each round, and together send a MDS code, 5 We next show that this strategy achieves rate asymptotically, via the following series of lemmas.
Lemma 12:
Given the four-node acyclic network in Fig. 13 , let denote the sum of largest degree of freedom of links in the network. Suppose the adversary introduces errors on forward links subject to the constraint that the values sent along the feedback links are unaffected. There exists a generic linear code for the forward links that corrects these error links.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Since the sum of largest degree of freedom is at most from the Condition 1, we obtain .
Definition 4: Given a set of any forward links in the four-node acyclic network, we say gives consistent output if and the decoded output from any code symbols on is the same.
Lemma 13: Given the four-node network in Fig. 13 such that , rate is achievable. Proof: Since , any claim can be sent reliably from to using a repetition code. The details of proof is presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 14:
Given the four-node network in Fig. 13 such that , rate is achievable. Proof: When , reliable transmission of claims from to is not guaranteed. Thus, we cannot use the same technique used in the proof of Lemma 13. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
C. Zigzag Network
In this section, we consider a special case of the zigzag network, the nonoverlapping zigzag network. We present conditions under which our upper bound is tight and derive a general achievable bound for nonoverlapping zigzag network.
We call the network shown in Fig. 15 a -layer nonoverlapping zigzag network. Unlike the general zigzag network, feedback transmission is only possible from to . and can communicate reliably with unbounded rate to and , respectively.
. Thus, reliable transmission with unbounded rate is possible from to , and from to for . We use and to denote the set of forward links and feedback links from to , and from to , respectively. Let and . In this network, we assume that each feedback link from to has a sufficient capacity to forward all the information received from . It is clear that the four-node network is a one-layer nonoverlapping zigzag network. Given a -layer zigzag network , we use to denote the upper bound on obtained from Theorem 1. Now we consider the following strategy for nonoverlapping zigzag network, which is similar to that for a four-node network. We use to denote the sum of all forward link capacities.
In each round, and together send a MDS code to and across the cut . For sends its codeword symbols to along each feedback link using a repetition code. For each feedback link , let denote the information received by on . compares with , which is received from . If , then obtains a guess identifying the locations of adversarial links between and assuming is reliable. sends claim to along each link using repetition code. If does not obtain any claim. For all sends any received claim from to the sink reliably. The above strategy is applied in each round. sends claims only when guesses at least one adversarial forward link, which is different from forward links guessed by at previous rounds.
For a four-node acyclic network in Fig. 13 , Lemma 13 shows that our bound is tight when claims are sent reliably from node to the sink , i.e., . Using our strategy, we simply extend this result for the nonoverlapping zigzag network as follows.
Lemma 15: Given a family of -layer nonoverlapping zigzag networks such that for , rate is achievable.
Proof: Since for , any claim can be sent reliably from to using a repetition code. Then, sends this claim reliably to sink . As in the proof of Lemma 13, we first show that at least one adversarial link is removed whenever sink receives some claim, in Case 1). We also show that correct output is always achievable when no claims are sent in Case 2).
Case 1) Sink receives some claim . Assume that feedback link is between and , and sends this claim to . In this case, we use the same strategy as in Case 1 in Lemma 13. Then, we show that the sink removes at least one bad link whenever it receives claim.
Case 2) No claims are sent to the sink. Similar to Case 2 in the proof of Lemma 13, the case that no claims are sent to the sink occurs only when for each feedback link between and either of the following holds. • The information receives on is equal to where is the uncorrupted codeword sent by to . • The guessed set only contains forward links that have been guessed by in previous rounds. From these previous rounds, by Case 1), the sink has already identified as adversarial either or the guessed forward links, and is concerned only with the remaining network. Either way, there are the following two possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that transmits to ). a) All forward links in and feedback links in are not corrupted. b) For some such that , all feedback links in are corrupted and some forward links in are corrupted. The furthest downstream forward links in can be also corrupted. For , links in and are not corrupted. Let . [Note that corresponds to the possibility in a)]. From a) and b), there are total possibilities. Exactly only one of them is true. Now we describe how the correct solution with rate can be obtained. We check the consistency of the output for each possibility. For each , we first remove corresponding feedback links and check whether there are forward links giving consistent output such that remaining forward links are elements of . If such a set exists, we denote it by . If there is no such set of forward links giving consistency, we remove from and ignore corresponding possibilities. Now we show that only tuples such that gives the correct output remain in . Since at least one remaining tuple gives the correct output, it is sufficient to prove that for any remaining and and gives the same output. This is equivalent to showing that the sum of capacities of forward links, which are contained in both and is at least , i.e.,
gives forward links giving consistent output such that remaining forward links are in . Similarly, gives forward links giving consistent output such that remaining forward links are in . In this case, from the definition of cut-set upper bound in Lemma 6, the sum of the capacities of forward links assumed to be correct by both and is at least . Since each guess gives consistent output, these two guesses gives the same output. Since any two remaining guesses in give the same consistent output, all remaining guesses give the same output.
We derive another condition under which our bound is tight.
Lemma 16: Given a family of -layer nonoverlapping zigzag networks such that and for any , rate is achievable. Proof: We consider a reduced nonoverlapping zigzag network shown in Fig. 16 , which is obtained from a given -layer nonoverlapping zigzag network by erasing feedback links . We use to denote the upper bound on from Theorem 1. Since is weaker than , it is sufficient to show that and is achievable on .
Step , rate is achievable on . Thus, given a nonoverlapping zigzag network , we first ignore all feedback links between and and apply the same achievable strategy for .
From Steps 1) and 2), we complete the proof. Now we derive an achievable rate of guess-and-forward strategy for any nonoverlapping zigzag network.
We use to denote the nonoverlapping zigzag network obtained from original by erasing all feedback links in such that
. Let denote the number of forward links between th layer and th layer. Supersets , and are defined as follows:
Lemma 17: Given the network in Fig. 15 , rate is achievable. Proof: We first show that rate is achievable for . We ignore all feedback links except the feedback links in . Then, applying the same achievability strategy for fournode acyclic network gives the rate from Lemmas 13 and 14.
For any subset , we ignore all feedback links except the feedback links in such that . Then, from Lemma 15, rate is achievable. Similarly, for any subset , rate is achievable from Lemma 16. This completes the proof.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the capacity of single-source single-sink noiseless networks under adversarial attack on no more than edges. In this work, we have allowed arbitrary link capacities, unlike prior papers. We have proposed a new cut-set upper bound for the error-correction capacity for general acyclic networks. This bound tightens previous cut-set upper bounds. For example networks where the bounds are tight, we have employed both linear and nonlinear coding strategies to achieve the capacity. We have proved the insufficiency of linear network codes to achieve the capacity in general. We also have shown by examples that there exist single-source and single-sink networks for which intermediate nodes must perform coding, nonlinear error detection, or error correction in order to achieve the network capacity. This is unlike the equal link capacity case, where coding only at the source suffices to achieve the capacity of any single-source and single-sink network. We have introduced a new achievable strategy, guess-and-forward, which is used to show the capacity of the two-node network and a family of four-node acyclic networks. Finally, for a class of so-called nonoverlapping zigzag networks, we have derived the rate achieved by guess-and-forward and presented conditions under which that bound is tight.
Further work includes characterizing the capacity region of a four-node acyclic network when the capacity of feedback links is small. When the lower bound on the feedback link capacity is not satisfied, we can investigate also the tightness of our bound or find an achievable capacity region. It would also be interesting to find new achievable strategies and upper bounds for more general zigzag and other networks, particularly since cut-set approaches are not sufficient in general [20] . Investigating networks for which there exists a gap between known upper and lower bounds may provide further insights. Another related problem, which we treat briefly in our conference paper [17] , considers high-probability correction of errors in a causal adversary model as in [15] .
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 12:
Since the adversary controls forward links such that codewords on feedback links are unchanged, from Definition 3, the degree of freedom of errors that the adversary can control for any forward link is at most . We prove this lemma by simply extending [4, Th. 4] , which is for the equal link capacities case to the unequal link capacities case.
Let denote the transfer matrix whose columns are the coding vectors assigned to links. Then, the difference set is where denotes the number of links error occurs and denotes the output of error vector at the sink with zero input.
Last equality comes from .
We use to denote the maximum number of different error vectors when the adversary controls links. Since
Since is the sum of largest degree of freedom, . Thus
where is the sum of all forward link capacities.
After computing the size of the difference set , we apply exactly the same argument as in [4, Th. 4] . From the argument in the proof of [4, Th. 4] , it is sufficient to show the existence of parity check matrix such that for all where . By using the same technique in [4, Th. 4] , the number of matrices such that there exists satisfying is upper bounded by Thus, if is a prime power such that , then there must exist a matrix such that for all and the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 13: Since , any claim can be sent reliably from to using a repetition code. In Case 1), we first show that at least one adversarial link is removed whenever sink receives some claim. In Case 2), we show that rate is achievable even when no claims are sent from . Case 1) Sink receives some claim . The sink compares with , which is received from reliably. If , then feedback link transmitting is adversarial and the sink ignores it. Otherwise, is reliable. Since the claim is sent, the sink knows that and that guess is correct. Thus, the sink identifies as adversarial the links in , which are subsequently ignored. Therefore, in this case, the sink removes at least one bad link whenever sends claims.
Case 2) No claims are sent. From our strategy, the case that no claims are sent from occurs only when for each feedback link either of the following holds.
• The information receives on is equal to where is the uncorrupted codeword sent by to . • The guessed set only contains forward links that have been guessed by in previous rounds. From these previous rounds, by Case 1), the sink has already identified as adversarial either or the guessed forward links, and is concerned only with the remaining network. Either way, there are the following three possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that transmits to ). I) All links between and and all feedback links are uncorrupted. Then, and is reliably transmitted. II) Some links between and are corrupted so that receives from , but the adversary controls all feedback links such that each feedback link changes to . III) Some links between and are corrupted such that codewords sends along each feedback link are unchanged, i.e., and . All feedback links are reliable and receives . If possibility I) is true, all links between and and all feedback links are uncorrupted. Then, there exists a set of forward links on the cut such that this set includes all links between and and some links between and , and gives consistent output with rate . (Note that the sum of capacities of any forward links is larger than or equal to from the definition of our bound in Theorem 1.) If possibility II) is true, all feedback links are corrupted. Then, there exist a set of forward links on the cut that gives consistent output with rate . If possibility III) is true, then we obtain the correct output from MDS code in Lemma 12. Based on the above analysis, we give the following simple decoding algorithm and prove the correctness of this algorithm as follows. 
END IF
Case 2a) There is a set composed of forward links giving consistent output.
In this case, we show that output with rate obtained from is correct. First, we prove that output from is correct when II) or III) is true. If II) is true, all feedback links are corrupted and thus contains at least uncorrupted links. From the definition of our upper bound in Lemma 5, the sum of capacities of any forward links is larger than or equal to . Since gives consistent output, the output is correct. If III) is true, contains at most corrupted links. In this case, we can show that gives correct output using Condition 2. Since III) is true and the values on feedback links remain the same, when adversary controls a set of forward links, , the degree of freedom adversary can control is at most . From Condition 2, the sum of degree of freedom of links in plus the sum of capacities of forward links not included in is less than or equal to , i.e., . Therefore, contains at least rate uncorrupted output and the output is correct. As shown above, using Condition 2, we have shown that contains at least one correct output if III) is true and complete the proof from the consistency of .
Case 2ai) There is no set of links that includes all forward links from to and gives consistent output. In this case, possibility I) cannot hold and thus II) or III) is true. Thus, output from is correct. Case 2aii) There exists a set composed of forward links that includes all links from to and gives consistent output.
We first show that and gives the same consistent output. is obtained from the cut by erasing forward links from to that does not include and forward links does not include. From the definition of our bound in Lemma 6,  . Thus, and give the same consistent output. Since gives the correct output when I) is true, and and
give the same consistent output in this case, output from is correct when I) is true. Moreover, we have already shown that gives the correct output if II) or III) is true. Therefore, always gives correct output. Case 2b) There is no set of forward links giving consistent output.
In this case, there are more than adversarial forward links on the cut. Thus, II) cannot hold and I) or III) is true. If there is no set of forward links that includes all links from to and gives consistent output, then III) is true. From Lemma 12, output obtained from MDS code is correct. Otherwise, suppose that there exists a set composed of forward links that includes all links from to and gives consistent output. We show that output obtained from is correct. If possibility I) is true, since all links between and and all feedback links are uncorrupted, contains at most corrupted forward links between and . From the definition of the Singleton bound, the sum of capacities of links between and plus the sum of any forward links between and is larger than or equal to . Thus, from uncorrupted links between and and some links between and , which are not corrupted, we obtain the correct output rate . Since gives consistent output, the decoded output is correct. If possibility III) is true, the adversary controls some forward links from to such that each feedback link transmits , and contains at most unknown corrupted links. Using Condition 1, we will show that the output obtained from is correct. If is a set of truly corrupted forward links, the degree of freedom adversary can control is at most . From the definition, the degree of freedom of any forward link from to is equal to the link capacity. From Condition 1, the sum of degree of freedom of truly corrupted links in and the sum of forward links between and , which are not included in is less than or equal to . Therefore, contains at least uncorrupted symbols.
Since gives consistent output, the decoded output from is correct. As shown above, when III) is true, we can obtain correct output using Condition 1.
Therefore, when either I) or III) is true, gives the correct output.
Proof of Lemma 14: Since , a claim for any feedback link is not reliably transmitted to the sink and adversarial links between and can corrupt this claim arbitrarily. Thus, the sink can receive different claims on different incoming links. Let be the set of distinct claims where denotes that no claims received. Here is the outline of the proof. We first show that at least one adversarial link is removed except when and the sink receives no claim on all links for all feedback links. When and the sink receives no claim on all links, since all links cannot be corrupted at the same time, the sink knows that does not send any claim. This case exactly corresponds to Case 2) in the proof of Lemma 13 and we achieve the correct output. This completes the proof. Note that the same guess-and-forward strategy in Section V-B2 is used.
First, we show that any uncorrupted forward links between and give the correct decoded output with rate . From the definition of Singleton bound, after erasing links between and and any set of links between and , the sum of the remaining link capacities is larger than or equal to . Thus, any uncorrupted links between and give the correct message. Now we assume that is received on links and is received on links . First, we ignore any claiming that there are more than adversarial links between and . Since is shown on links, believing implies more than adversarial links on the cut, which is a contradiction. Thus, each of remaining claims specifies a set , which is composed of at least links between and claimed to be correct by . For each such claim, we check the consistency of the decoded outputs of . We show that if there exist two different claims and both corresponding to consistent outputs, then those two outputs should be the same. Since , and
As we mentioned at the beginning of the proof, the sum of capacities of any link between and is larger than or equal to . Therefore, and give the same consistent output.
Suppose that we have figured out that a set of links gives the correct consistent decoded output. In this case, we add remaining links not included in sequentially to , and check the consistency of any decoded output with rate . If outputs are no more consistent, the added link is adversarial . Now we show that at least one adversarial link is removed except when and the sink receives no claim on all links for all feedback links. Case 1) All claims are ignored or none of the remaining claims gives consistent output or all claims that give consistent output satisfy that In this case, there are only two possibilities. I) Feedback link is adversarial. II) Feedback link is reliable and all links between and are adversarial. If , then possibility II) cannot hold and feedback link is adversarial. We remove it. If , the sink checks the consistency of outputs from each set of links between and . If no links set give consistency, then there are more than adversarial links between and . Thus, possibility I) is true and we remove feedback link . Otherwise, there exists a set of links giving consistency. Since this set contains at most corrupted links, and thus includes at least uncorrupted links between and , then the sum of capacities of uncorrupted links is larger than or equal to . Thus, gives correct output rate . From , we can detect forward adversarial links in this case.
Case 2) There exists a claim giving consistent output and . We show that the output obtained from claim should be correct. If there is at least one uncorrupted link showing , then feedback link is also not corrupted since , and this claim gives correct output rate . Otherwise, if all links showing this claim are adversarial, then there are at most adversarial links between and . Then, includes at least uncorrupted links, and thus gives correct consistent output. From , we can also detect adversarial links in this case. Case 3) Only gives consistent output and . In this case, the set of all forward links from to gives consistent output. The links between and include at least uncorrupted links since . Thus, we obtain correct consistent output from links and detect adversarial links from . Case 4) Only gives consistent output, , and at least one of links between and shows claim different from , i.e., .
Case 4a)
. If feedback link is reliable, the links showing claims different from are adversarial. Thus, there are more than adversarial links and this is a contradiction. Thus, feedback link is adversarial and we remove it.
Case 4b)
. is shown on links and links show claims different from . Thus, there are at least adversarial links between and . Then there are at most adversarial links between and and at least uncorrupted links. Thus, we also obtain correct output from links and use to detect the adversarial links.
Case 4c) . Since , feedback link transmits to and does not send any claim. Thus, the links showing claims different from are all adversarial.
For Cases 1)-4), we have shown that at least one adversarial link is removed when and the sink receives some claim different from for any feedback link.
To complete the proof it is now sufficient to show that correct output can be achieved when and the sink receives no claim for all feedback links . Since , at least one link between and is uncorrupted. Since all links show , this means that each feedback link transmits and does not send any claim. This case corresponds to Case 2) in Lemma 13. Therefore, we can obtain the correct output. 
